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Now that economists’ eyes are fixed squarely on
Greece, a puzzle has emerged that this article attempts
to solve. Since 2008, tens of billions of euros have fled
Greek bank accounts. Yet somehow the country still
has a current account deficit. Where has this money
come from?
Normally, things do not work like this for nations in
crisis. Greece has experienced severe capital flight yet
its current account deficit has remained almost
unchanged; its international reserves have barely
changed. On net, 24 billion euros of private capital
left the country between 2008 and 2010, but Greece
still managed to accumulate a current account deficit
of 85 billion euros, i.e. 12 percent of GDP.
Where has the money come from? The answer can be
found by looking at the balance of payments statistics
– primarily from fresh loans provided by eurozone
central banks to the Greek central bank. Between
2008 and 2010 these loans amounted to 76 billion
euros. This figure is almost
90 percent of the cumulative cur-
rent account deficit during this
period and it has been increasing
rapidly: it reached 110 billion
euros in June 2011.
Although these Eurosystem
loans are channelled via the ECB,
the funds involved are over and
beyond those used in the ECB’s
government bond purchase pro-
gramme – a programme opposed
by Jürgen Stark, Germany’s top
representative at the ECB, who has recently resigned.
Furthermore, they are different from those provided
by the EU rescue package to Greece, which was rati-
fied by the German parliament on 29 September.
While tough public spending cuts are attached to the
EU rescue package, the Eurosystem loans have no
such restrictions. They have already been disbursed
and spent by Greece. Moreover, they do not need par-
liamentary ratification.
The Eurosystem loans to Greece were small until 2007.
Since then, however, their total sum has increased
enormously, as shown in Figure 1. Together with the
large increase in official inflows from the IMF and the
EU, these loans have allowed Greece to avoid the
extensive expenditure cut – both public and private –
that typically occurs in countries experiencing a sharp
reversal in private capital inflows. As demonstrated in
Figure 1, the current account deficit, the excess of
national expenditure – including interest payments –
over national income has hardly improved in the face
of the rapid drop in private capital flows.
In theory, Eurosystem loans should not be counted as
long-term debt because they only represent transitory
debits and credits across central banks that allow for
a smooth settlement of trades in goods and services.
Thus, the Eurosystem loans line in Figure 1 should in
theory not be far away from zero for an extended peri-
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od of time. Starting in 2008,
however, this has not been the
case for Greece. In fact, the
Eurosystem loans to Greece have
taken on a magnitude which
makes them anything but transi-
tory. In other words, it looks like
this line is not going to revert
zero anytime soon.
The data on official inflows and
Eurosystem loans are buried in
two obscure lines in the balance
of payments statistics of the IMF.
Official inflows are captured by
‘other investments – government’,
while the Eurosystem loans are
captured by ‘other investments – monetary authori-
ties’. In the national central banks’ accounts, the
Eurosystem loans correspond to the so-called Target
balances, which Hans-Werner Sinn and Timo
Wollmershäuser (2011) have investigated.1
The mechanism by which Eurosystem loans have led
Greece to avoid the sharp adjustment in its current
account has enabled the Greek central bank to
increase domestic credit in the face of a massive capi-
tal flight. In fact, as shown in Figure 2, starting in 2008
the strong increase in domestic credit provided by the
Greek central bank mirrors the cumulative Greek lia-
bilities to the Eurosystem that resulted largely from the
Eurosystem loans illustrated in Figure 1. Interestingly
enough, both the monetary base and international
reserves remained practically unchanged.
This lack of expenditure adjustment contrasts with
Mexico in the wake of the Tequila Crisis: from a cur-
rent account deficit of 7 percent of GDP in the year
prior to the crisis, Mexico was forced to practically
balance its current account during the crisis year
(– 0.5 percent in 1995 and – 0.7 percent in 1996).2 In
1995 Mexico experienced a sharp real depreciation
and a deep recession. By 1996, however, net exports
rebounded and economic growth resumed. At the
time it was argued that Mexico could have avoided the
severe crisis by adjusting in early 1994. Unfortunately,
like Greece today, the authorities chose to increase
domestic credit to delay a recession. The difference
between Mexico and Greece is that, while Mexico had
to run down its international reserves, Greece has
been able to keep them practically unchanged. Instead
Greece has used the EU rescue package and the
Eurosystem loans to increase domestic credit. Had
Greece been a typical small economy with no access
to rescue packages, it would have had to close its mas-
sive current account deficit by now. Its ability to main-
tain such massive current account deficit in the face of
a sharp reversal in private capital inflows will be
recorded in the annals of financial crises as a remark-
ably rare feat.
It is time to address Greece’s economic policy
options in a holistic manner and stop the emergency
measures that only provide Greece with another life-
line. Greece’s fresh financing needs are much larger
than those considered in the Greek rescue package.
The financing gap has been covered with de jure
revolving loans from European central banks to the
Greek central bank that de facto have become long-
term debt. This backdoor financing, however, can-
not go on indefinitely. Jürgen Stark’s resignation
should help concentrate minds in finding a long-last-
ing solution.
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1 The Target balances are also discussed in Garber (1998).
2 Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) discuss Mexico’s balance of pay-
ments crisis in detail.